Abstract-Custom hardware is expensive and making software reliable is difficult to achieve as complexity increases. Recent trends towards cloud computing highlight the importance of operating continuously using both unreliable commodity hardware and, as services grow in complexity, failure-vulnerable software. We have developed an approach for building dependable networking software that exposes a reliable encapsulation service to clients although it executes on commodity hardware; we do so without substantially increasing the implementation complexity of the encapsulation software. Our approach demonstrates the viability of building reliable systems using unreliable components, including unreliable server software.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Encapsulation is commonly used as an approach to add additional features to the network without having to change the underlying network protocol -IPsec [1] , Teredo [2] , Mobile IP [3] , and IP-in-IP [4] are all examples of this paradigm. These solutions are typically deployed in a client/server arrangement with many client devices running the encapsulation protocol connecting to a single server responsible for decapsulating traffic and passing it on to the destination network. Failure in the client component causes network traffic to stop for that client; server failure causes all clients to lose access, and is thus the more significant problem. Current systems approach this problem from one of two perspectives: (1) a complex, but transparent, server-side failover solution that ensures clients maintain connectivity; (2) a simple and cheap, but non-transparent, client-side approach that requires all clients to reconnects to some new server, breaking all existing connections in the process.
One of the more complex aspects of handling server failure in an encapsulation environment is ensuring that traffic is still routed to the client after failure has occurred. Encapsulation systems are typically exposed to the client as a virtual network interface that receives a subset of all IP traffic generated by the client, with each interface being assigned an IP address that acts as the source IP for all traffic entering the encapsulation system. The address assigned to the client typically comes from a subnet that has been assigned to the corresponding server, with different servers assigning addresses from different subnets. Consequently, if a client disconnects from a server and connects to another one, it will not keep its IP address, which will cause all flows traversing the system to break. This is undesirable; many applications do not handle address changes well; further, it requires handling server failure on a per-application basis. It is preferable if migration from one server to another is accomplished without changing the virtualinterface address, making it transparent to the client.
The major contribution of this paper is to solve this problem using unreliable server encapsulation software executing on commodity hardware, thus providing dependable encapsulation service extremely cheaply. We achieve this by noting that any encapsulation system requires client-side software; as such, it is not unreasonable to add client-side logic to help address the problem of system reliability; the essence of our solution is to maintain a second connection to an alternate encapsulation server that can provide the same service. The alternate server simply needs to know the client IP address being advertized to the wider network, not the state of the current connection as is required in traditional transparent failover. We analyze our solution, and provide experimental validation of our architecture as implemented in an existing encapsulation system. We show that clients experience limited packet loss, and no connection loss, during server failover, with the total failover time taking on the order of a second to complete. Our solution requires few modifications, and has components that can be utilized by others to achieve similar results. Our solution is believed to be the first example of a failure-tolerant encapsulation architecture that requires neither a complex server implementation, nor passive failover devices. We believe that this work is applicable not only in the discussed example but also in other commonly used encapsulation systems, including VPNs, IPv6 transition technologies, and Mobile IP-compatible systems. Wide adoption of the principles proposed here will make it possible to develop and deploy highly available encapsulation systems in the future, without having each system develop their own approach for providing fault-tolerance and high-availability capabilities.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Encapsulation has a long history of being used to provide additional functionality to IPv4. It is commonly used in two separate but related roles, legacy support and network isolation. Encapsulation has been used to enable non-IPv4 protocols to be usable over the Internet; a variety of standards describe this mode of operation (GRE, 6to4, Teredo). A more common deployment architecture, however, uses encapsulation to provide isolation for IPv4 traffic that traverses the Internet. One common example of using encapsulation to provide network isolation is a Virtual Private Network (VPN) scenario. The network isolation approach has also been codified in a number of standards (IP-in-IP, IPsec) as well as being used by application designers (OpenVPN).
There are two distinct approaches to performing encapsulation -wrapping the data to be encapsulated directly in IP, or utilizing a transport protocol running over IP to carry the encapsulated data. There are many standard examples of both approaches: Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), 6to4, IPin-IP, and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) all encapsulate their data in raw IPv4 packets, enabling routers to treat these forms of traffic differently from TCP or UDP. Newer protocols have adopted the latter approach, with protocols such as Teredo and OpenVPN encapsulating their data in either TCP or UDP. The reasons for this are discussed below.
Protocols that directly encapsulate traffic in IPv4 are the ideal approach because they minimize the overhead added to every packet. While preferable from an overhead perspective, they encounter major deployment issues on the Internet today, due to the prevalence of Network Address Translation (NAT) in access networks and restrictive firewall configurations. This has caused problems not only for encapsulation systems (see IPsec passthrough mode on some routers) but for newer transport protocols, such as Stream Control Transfer Protocol (SCTP), as well. To work around these issues, several encapsulation protocols have been updated to utilize transportlevel encapsulation. RFC3948 [5] was developed to allow IPsec to function in the presence of NAT by wrapping the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) packets in UDP.
While stateful transport protocols can be used in encapsulation systems, using TCP as the underlying transport for both UDP and TCP application data causes substantial performance issues when packet loss is experienced. This is due to the interaction between the encapsulation and application TCP congestion control algorithms; packet loss on the link causes substantial backoffs and long delays. As a result, using TCP as a transport protocol in an encapsulation system is rare.
The protocol used to encapsulate data has a direct impact on the complexity of enabling seamless server failover. Approaches that utilize a stateless transport layer, either directly using IP or wrapping a payload in UDP, can potentially utilize existing IP-redundancy protocols such as the Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP) or the Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP). Both servers would be configured to share a single IP address, with the primary server receiving all traffic and the standby configured to take over should the primary fail. If the IP redundancy protocol is used both on the inbound and outbound interfaces and the servers synchronize any required application state, then a client will not notice a server failure. This does not work with approaches that utilize a stateful transport layer; IP redundancy protocols do not support migration of TCP connections. There is no widely supported mechanism to migrate the state of a TCP connection between operating system instances, requiring that the client handle failure cases through a reconnection approach.
One approach that researchers have proposed to enable failover in servers that utilize a stateful transport layer is described in FT-TCP [6] , a set of extensions to the standard TCP transport protocol that enables multiple hosts to share TCP state. This approach is undesirable for encapsulation systems that we describe here for two reasons -one, it forces you to utilize TCP as the underlying transport layer; two, it forces a tight coupling between the hosts running the decapsulator software.
The IP-redundancy protocols have limitations as well: only a single machine can be the primary server for a specific IP address. Load balancing across HSRP or VRRP requires multiple IP addresses configured on the cluster, with each machine assigned as primary to one of the addresses [7] . This complicates active-active configurations with more than a single server because it is now necessary to load balance clients across all IP addresses exposed by the system.
Utilizing existing IP-redundancy protocols directly has the advantage of simplifying the client: it simply connects to a single IP address and passes traffic to the server. The tradeoff to this simplicity is the complexity of the server implementation -it becomes necessary to synchronize all state used in the decapsulation process between all of the failover servers in real time, otherwise a failure of the primary server will result in the interruption of service to the client. This state is not always static -IPsec requires that session keys for each client be shared between all servers that may process a client's traffic, and any service with restricted access requires that authentication information be shared between all servers. The complexity of this state synchronization only increases as the encapsulation system is expanded to support a larger number of servers that can be simultaneously used, especially in load-balancing architectures. It is relatively straightforward to synchronize two servers that are sharing an IP address in an active/passive architecture, but synchronizing many servers in an active/active architecture is a much more difficult problem.
We sidestep many of these concerns by pushing failover logic to the client: a small amount of extra logic enables clients to connect to an arbitrary number of servers that do not need to be directly synchronized with the other servers in the failover cluster. It enables the solution to scale to a large number of servers in an active/active architecture without requiring complex server-side logic, TCP-connection migration, or scaling IP-redundancy protocols.
III. DESIGN
A reliable encapsulation endpoint architecture does not exist in a vacuum: it is built on top of existing encapsulation systems, and therefore the design will be implemented differently depending on the specifics of the particular encapsulation system in question. The high-level architecture of the encapsulation failover architecture is discussed here in relation to a standard encapsulation architecture, and how IP continuity is achieved in our system. Our specific implementation is not described here; it is covered in the following section. A typical encapsulation architecture has two components, as shown in Figure 1 : the encapsulation node (EN) and the decapsulation node (DN) 1 . The EN typically runs on a client device, such as a smartphone or a laptop, and initiates a connection to the DN. The DN typically runs somewhere in the network that is connected to the next hop for the encapsulated traffic. This can include a private network, the IPv6 Internet, or the IPv4 Internet, depending on the system. The EN and DN may participate in one or more authentication sessions, encryption-algorithm negotiations, or other configuration steps before both endpoints are ready to transfer data. Completion of the initialization process will result in any packets that the EN receives on its virtual interface being sent to the DN. Once the EN has established a session with the DN, it cannot migrate to another DN without tearing down its session with the first; this is necessitated both by the assignment of an IP address to the EN (the EN is set as having the DN as its last hop) and potentially by the transport protocol employed by the EN and DN themselves. Each DN assigns its ENs an IP address from a different pre-configured subnet prevent duplicate address assignment. Typically, the DN is implemented on specialized or dedicated hardware, to ensure that the encapsulation system offers high availability to the ENs.
Our encapsulation failover architecture, in contrast, has four components, as shown in Figure 2 : the encapsulation node (EN), the decapsulation node (DN), the decapsulation node failure detector (DN-FD), and the edge service router (ESR). In this architecture the EN and DN occupy the same roles that they do in the traditional encapsulation architecture, with some minor differences. The ESR acts to ensure that the IP address assigned to an EN can be migrated between DNs when a failure occurs by maintaining a system-wide EN-to-DN map. The DN-FD acts to detect a failure of the DN, and kills nodes acting in an erroneous manner.
A major difference between our architecture and a typical one is that our DNs do not run on specialized hardware; instead commodity hardware is used. This is important both because it reduces the cost of deploying our solution, and because it increases the deployment flexibility. Another difference is that the EN connects to multiple (k+1, k >0) DNs, where k is the maximum number of supported concurrent DN failures. The first DN that the EN connects to is responsible for sending configuration settings, including IP address, to the EN -this DN also becomes the initial destination for all client traffic. During the setup process with the additional k DNs, the EN supplies its configuration (including assigned IP address) and marks the DN as 'secondary'. Being marked as 'secondary' does not cause the DN to treat the EN any differently, it simply maintains the session in preparation for a failover situation. By having the EN connect to k+1 independent DNs, the system is able to tolerate k concurrent DN failures without issue. This requires provisioning a total of n+k DNs to handle all of the clients of the system; n is the number of DNs required to handle all client traffic assuming no failures. As the number of DNs increases this becomes much cheaper than deploying a typical failover encapsulation system, where each active DN is paired with a standby DN to handle all of its client traffic during a failure. Our solution is also more robust to failures -if 2 DNs fail in a traditional failover deployment, and these DNs are the primary and standby for the same group of clients, the clients will all lose connectivity. This is not a mode of failure our system is vulnerable to. Intelligent load-balancing is required in our solution to ensure clients are properly spread across all n+k DNs, however cluster loadbalancing is a problem that has already been the subject of much research and is commonly handled today.
IV. ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS OF A FAILOVER
In order to characterize the behaviour of the system during a failure a brief analysis of the operation of the system during a failure has been performed. This analysis will help to provide context to the experimental results and provide a brief sanity check to ensure that the measured results are logical. Recovering from a node failure in the system is characterized by three key events which all impact the speed at which a failover will occur. The system is shown in Figure 3 , where a failure occurs at time T 0 . Prior to T 0 the system was behaving properly; traffic was being encapsulated at the EN and was flowing through DN 1 . At T 0 , DN 1 experiences a failure and is killed. This stops all traffic flowing between the client application and the server.
At time T 1 , the EN detects that DN 1 has failed. The exact nature by which the client determines the existence of a failure is not relevant here, as the minimum bound can be calculated independently of failure detection mechanism. The minimum value of T 1 is:
It will take at least half of a round trip for the notification to travel from the DN to the EN; it will also take δ time for the DN host to to detect that the DN process has died and close the connections previously owned by the DN process. At time T 1 the EN changes its behaviour and begins directing all of the client-application traffic to DN 2 . DN 2 first determines that a failure has occurred at T 2 , when it receives a message from the EN. This will occur approximately RT T 2 seconds after T 1 , assuming that the message is not delayed or lost. At time T 2 DN 2 marks itself as the primary DN for the EN, and injects a route into its local routing table. Hence, at T 2 the client application can send traffic to the server properly; yet the server is not able to pass data to the client application, because the reverse route has not yet propagated to the ESR.
Once the DN daemon running on DN 2 has injected the EN route update, a variable amount of time will pass before the routing daemon, also running on DN 2 , detects the routing-table change. T 3 is defined as the time when the routing daemon has detected the addition to the routing table, at which point the routing daemon broadcasts this information to the other DNs and the ESR. The ESR, connected on the same subnet to both DNs, will receive this update message some time after T 3 . Once the routing daemon running on the ESR has processed the packet and has added the route into its routing table, the system will have reached time T 4 . T 4 is defined as the time when the system is again functioning properly and traffic can flow bidirectionally between the client application and the server.
One possible optimization that can reduce the overall time required to complete a failover involves DN 2 detecting the failure of DN 1 itself. This would allow the time between T 3 and T 4 to proceed in parallel with the time between T 1 and T 2 , reducing the failover time to the maximum of these two intervals. Given that the typical latency between a client and server running over the Internet is in the range of tens or hundreds of milliseconds, having DN 2 mark itself as primary before the EN has detected the failure would result in a decrease in the failover time observed by the EN. This optimization is safe even if DN 1 has not died -traffic originating from the EN will continue to pass through DN 1 , while traffic returning to the EN will pass through DN 2 . While asynchronous routing is not ideal, traffic still flows in both directions because both links are available.
In addition to understanding the sources of delay, it is important to understand the characteristics of each delay source to help improve the understanding of why certain results are observed in the experimental results. The differences between T 0 and T 1 , and T 1 and T 2 are likely to be somewhat static regardless of the test, as the RTT in a typical environment is likely to be relatively stable. The difference between T 2 and T 3 is much more variable, however, as the routing daemon polls the routing table on a fixed interval, yet the EN route can be injected at any point in this interval. The scanning interval configured on these systems was 1 second, the smallest value supported by the BIRD routing daemon. Finally, the time between T 3 and T 4 is going to depend upon the behaviour of the DN/ESR network and the current packet loss rate, as the multicast delivery mechanism does not guarantee that a routing update be received by all the other nodes. With a presumed low loss rate, and a high-speed DN/ESR network, this should be quite low, on the order of single-digit milliseconds.
A. System Details
Each of the DNs, in addition to being connected to the Internet (to terminate EN connections), is also connected to the ESR. The network connected to the ESR is the destination network of this encapsulation system. When a DN assigns an IP to the EN, it does so out of its own address pool; the ESR is configured with all the address ranges assigned to each DN. Figure 2 shows when a DN receives a packet from the EN, it decapsulates the packet and injects it into the backplane network. The packet will then be routed through the ESR before traveling to its final destination. Traffic destined for the EN follows a reverse of this path. While it may appear simpler to do away with the ESR role altogether and configure the DNs to perform this role, this does not scale as the number of DNs increases due to the previously-mentioned limitations of IP redundancy protocols.
ENs will migrate between DNs in the presence of failures, therefore the ESR needs to have an up-to-date view of which EN is connected to which DN. Establishing such a mapping of ENs to DNs is analogous to creating and maintaining a routing table; each EN acts as an end host and each DN acts as a packet router. We refer to this association table as the DN-EN Mapping Table; further, it must act as a reliable data store to ensure that the failure of any DN or ESR does not cause a service interruption. Given the similarity to a routing table, the DN-EN Mapping Table could be implemented using one of several dynamic routing protocols, including Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) or Routing Information Protocol (RIP). An alternative approach is to utilize a reliable shared data store, such as the Google Chubby Lock Service [8] , to persist the mapping table. The use of Chubby to store small pieces of identification information (such as host name to IP mappings) has been validated by Google; such a service could feasibly store the EN-DN Mapping Table reliably as well.
B. Detecting Failures
The decapsulation node failure detector (DN-FD) is an independently developed piece of software that runs on each DN and monitors the state of the system to detect component failures (both hardware and software). This piece of software is independent of the encapsulation system; by separating the encapsulator from the failure detector it is possible to build a small, well-tested, and robust failure detector that can be utilized across different encapsulation systems. The design and implementation of the DN-FD can leverage much of the research that has already been done in this field; indeed the DN could signal error conditions directly to the DN-FD rather than relying on the DN-FD to detect all possible failures. Upon detecting a failure or inferring the presence of a failure, the DN-FD forcibly terminates the DN software and restarts it after a configurable period of time.
The use of commodity hardware as the underlying platform for the DNs exposes the system to many hardware failures; cost is often the primary concern when building commodity systems and reliability is often sacrificed to meet this goal (error-correcting RAM is rarely used, as one small example). Hardware failures on a given DN can be detected by the DNFDs running on the other DNs in the cluster; given that all the DNs are well-connected, there is minimal overhead in having a sub-second heartbeat shared by each DN-FD. It is difficult for ENs to rapidly detect a DN failures caused by hardware failure; connections do not immediately time out and there is the path latency between EN and DN slowing things down. Having each DN monitor the status of all other DNs enables a secondary DN to inform all of its ENs that their primary has failed and they should initiate a failover.
The implementation complexity of typical encapsulation software virtually guarantees that there will be failures caused by the DN software; it is the primary responsibility of the DN-FD to catch these and terminate the DN. It is possible for the DN-FD to monitor not just the DN software but also operating-system behaviour to detect anomalous conditions. As mentioned earlier, these are solved by immediately killing the DN; there is little cost in doing this because of the seamless failover mechanism.
Rapidly detecting failure of the network is, in contrast, difficult to accomplish in a data-efficient manner due to the difficulty in distinguishing arbitrary packet loss from a failure. The proposed failover architecture does not provide IP continuity in most network failure cases, because the DNs and ESR are located in the same logical network location. Loss of connectivity to one DN as a result of a network failure, then, implies that connectivity has been lost to all DNs. The DN cluster is deployed in a hub-and-spoke fashion, with each DN, ESR and border gateway connected to the subnet through a single Layer 2 link. Thus, network failure either occurs by partitioning a single DN from the network (link failure), or the hub dies and removes connectivity to all DNs; it is not expected that multi-node partition scenarios will be encountered. If a link failure occurs within the DN cluster it will be detected in the same manner as DN host failure; the DN-FD running on other DNs will be unable to reach the DN and will mark it as dead.
The EN is able to detect a DN failure using one of two approaches: detecting the DN failure itself, or having the secondary DN notify it that the primary has failed. The former approach can signal an error relatively quickly when failures are isolated to the DN software; the DN host returns a Port Unreachable message to the EN as soon as data is sent. The latter approach requires additional complexity in the DN cluster, however it is faster since the EN does not wait for a host to respond that is no longer available.
C. DN Failover
When the primary DN fails, the EN selects one of its secondary DNs to take over, and begins sending all of its traffic to this DN. Given that the DN had already been initialized, there is no delay in establishing a handshake with the DN, performing authentication, etc. When a secondary DN begins receiving traffic from the EN, it marks itself as the primary for this EN, and updates the shared data store to let all other DNs and ESRs know that it is now responsible for all packets destined to the specific EN. Figure 4 shows a simple example of a single EN and two DNs that experience a DN failure. Here, the system is functioning normally in (a), and once DN1 has failed (b) shows the result of the EN failing over, with DN2 adding the EN host address into the DN-EN Mapping Table. At this point, all traffic from the client is properly redirected back to the EN over one of the secondary DNs without a substantial interruption of service. While some packets are lost, including all outstanding packets in transit to the primary DN along with any packets returning to the DN from the destination server before the routing rule is applied, this constitutes a very small fraction of all the packets that are transmitted during the life of the encapsulation session. This can be partially remedied by performing buffering on the EN if packet loss is found to be a substantial issue.
Handling DN recovery has two issues: how the restarted DN handles new clients, and how ENs that previously used the DN are migrated back. When a DN first starts, it reads the DN-EN Mapping Table and notes any addresses from its address range that are currently in use by other DNs. It then ensures that it does not assign any of these addresses to newly connecting clients. When a DN handling clients that are not part of its primary subnet notices that the DN for this subnet is alive, it informs the EN that the primary DN is available again. The EN uses this information to establish a new session with the DN and once it has completed the initialization routine it marks the original DN as primary again and informs the secondary DN. The secondary DN, upon receiving this message, removes any information it had in the DN-EN Mapping Table, 
D. ESR Failover
Introducing the ESR component into the architecture adds another failure point into the system, however the simplicity of the ESR role makes it easy to add failover using existing protocols. Fundamentally, the role of the ESR is to determine which DN is able to reach a specific network address. It accomplishes this by participating in a routing algorithm that all of the DNs also participate in. It advertises itself as the next hop for all DN-assigned addresses and, as a result, it functions in a similar manner to a peering router in a standard routing architecture. Running a pair of commodity routers, either hardware or software, that share a virtual IP using any existing protocol (HSRP [9] , VRRP [10] , or CARP) will enable a cluster of ESRs to provide fully transparent failover to the DNs without requiring any DN-specific logic. In fact, existing hardware can be repurposed to accomplish this.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented our endpoint failover architecture in an existing encapsulation system named Accoriem. This encapsulation system provides mobility and aggregation services to multi-interface mobile devices, and uses a combination of TCP control channels and UDP data channels that run over each network interface. A typical client has two TCP connections and two UDP flows terminating on the same endpoint. Implementing the encapsulation failover architecture within the Accoriem system allows for an EN to seamlessly function in the presence of DN failures. The discussion here is focused on a single system, but other encapsulation systems are likely to be structured in a similar manner as they perform similar tasks. Adapting this discussion to alternative systems (such as OpenVPN) should be reasonably straightforward.
A. Accoriem
To provide some context to the discussion of the failover implementation, a brief description of the standard Accoriem architecture is provided. Figure 5 shows the modified system, if the additional DN is ignored it corresponds closely to the unmodified system. A detailed description of the Accoriem system can be found in Practical Multi-Interface Network Access for Mobile Devices [11] .
The EN is composed of a series of modules that are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating traffic and maintaining connection with the DN. As Figure 5 shows, there are four core modules in the EN. The tunnel module handles the virtual-tunnel interface, including reading and writing application IP packets and assigning the virtual IP address. The connector module detects physical-interface state changes and connects to the DN when an interface is available. This module manages configuration state, including virtual IP addresses. Once the connection has been established the link is passed to the host module. The host module is responsible for maintaining the links with the DN, sending and receiving packets over the appropriate interface, detecting DN loss, and other similar tasks. The client module acts as a go-between for the other modules; it does not have a major role in the base Accoriem system. The DN is similar; both the tunnel and host modules are the same as in the EN. The connection handler module processes incoming connections from new clients, and ensures the EN is configured before the connection is passed to the server module. The server module is responsible for maintaining the collection of hosts; one for each connected EN. The server is more complex than the equivalent client module, however, as packets received by the tunnel module are not all destined for the same EN. The server module maintains a lookup table of host objects indexed by their virtual IP address, allowing packets received by the tunnel to be passed to the appropriate EN. This lookup mechanism is also used to pass new connections from the connection handler to the appropriate host.
B. EN & DN Modifications
A high-level architecture of both the EN and DN can be found in Figure 5 ; the modules with a grey background were changed to support DN failover. While changes were required on both the EN and DN, it is worth noting how isolated the changes were. The data path was essentially untouched, demonstrating that the addition of DN failover capabilities should not change the overhead or delay introduced by the system during normal operation.
Changes to the EN involved two major components: the connection-initiation and connection-management modules. The connection-initiation module required two major additions: detecting the existence of secondary DNs, and sending configuration parameters from the EN to the secondary DNs. Given that each set of connections to a DN is independent from all other DNs, we just introduced a collection of DNs to connect to, and duplicated the existing connection initiator so that each one properly connected to its respective DN. Choosing the primary DN is simple -the first DN the client connects to is primary. This not only ensures that the client is connected as quickly as possible, it also simplifies the connection process by having a generic connection approach for all DNs.
The EN-side changes to the connection-management module primarily involved replicating the existing connection management and DN control logic to support multiple DNs. Our host module was initially responsible for transferring commands between the EN and DN, determining how to split traffic between the existing interfaces, and managing link information (latency, packet loss rate, etc.). Rather than complicate the existing link-management code, an additional layer of abstraction was added in the form of the client module. Instead of handling a single host, the client now maintains a collection of host objects; each representing an active DN. When the primary host informs the client it has disconnected, the client chooses another host from its collection and begins passing traffic over this host. The DN failure-detection code already existed; and changes to the client were constrained to how the connector passes newly-created host objects and which host would be passed traffic from the tunnel module.
The DN required changes in two modules: the initial clientconnection handler and the packet-processing module. It also required the creation of a new module to handle route injection. The initial client connection handler was modified to receive the ENs virtual IP addresses on secondary DNs, a trivial extension of the existing configuration mechanism. The creation of a module to inject routes was similarly straightforward: hooking into the Linux kernel netlink interface enabled the DN to add routes and took little additional code. The packet-processing module changes were solely to detect that a DN has changed from secondary to primary via the arrival of encapsulated packets from the client, triggering an injection of the EN IP address into the DN routing table. This added a single additional conditional check when processing of each packet; this was decided to be preferable to having the EN explicitly notify the DN it is now the primary. A data packet almost always arrives more quickly at the DN than a control message, making the control message redundant information. The use of control messages was thus decided to be suboptimal.
As described above, the reliable EN implementation has additional complexity as compared to the unreliable implementation, increasing the chances that the EN itself will experience a failure due to a bug in the code. This is unavoidable given the architecture of the EN; in order to properly establish a connection with multiple DNs and fail over between these connections it is necessary to modify how the EN maintains this information internally. While the EN is more complex, it is not substantially more complex (compared to the overall complexity of the entire system). Additionally, the additional logic is exercised whenever a client changes DNs, a relatively frequent operation. This increases the likelihood of any additional bugs being exposed.
C. DN-EN Mapping Table
One of the new components introduced in our system is the DN-EN Mapping Table; a distributed data store that is read by the ESR and both written to and read from by the DNs to ensure that each node in the system knows how to reach each EN. This mapping table is structured much like a routing table; as a result we chose a dynamic routing protocol to implement the DN-EN Mapping Table in Accoriem, specifically Open Shortest Path First (OSPF). Utilizing an existing distributed data store reduces the chances of introducing additional software failures, since OSPF implementations are relatively common and used by a large number of other systems. OSPF was chosen over alternatives (such as RIP or IS-IS) due to its simplicity, configurability, widespread deployment, and fast reconvergence time. The OSPF protocol maintains connectivity information about every other peer in its area; this information can be used to detect hardware failures in other DNs without requiring additional implementation work in the DN-FD.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
Using the solution implemented above, several microbenchmarks have been run to validate the proposal in the context of our implementation. The micro-benchmarks were run in a setup consisting of five machines as illustrated in Figure 6 : an EN running the client software, two DNs running the server software, an ESR running standard routing software, and a standard router acting as the Internet. The EN has two interfaces configured on different subnets, the DNs and ESR The performance of the system was evaluated in three different environments: one built entirely using virtual machines, one built entirely using low-powered commodity boxes, and one with a low-powered commodity client and a server cluster built from virtual machines. The first environment was designed to reflect the possible 'best case' deployment scenario -powerful machines all interconnected using a high-speed backbone. The second environment was designed to show the behaviour on hardware that is truly commodity -this hardware is obtainable by any individual for less than a typical desktop. The final scenario was designed to represent a reasonably realistic deployment scenario -low-powered clients such as mobile smartphones connected to machines running in a typical virtualized data centre.
The characteristics of the test network are somewhat different from what would be experienced on the Internet, both in terms of the latency and bandwidth available between the EN and DN. The latency between the EN and DN is submillisecond for all three testbeds, yet the latency separating the EN and the DN on the Internet is likely to have be much higher. Conversely, while the bandwidth of the link separating the EN and DN is one Gigabit per second, it is much more likely to be on the order of several Megabits per second on the Internet. The exact latency and bandwidth that exists between the EN and DN is going to depend heavily on the specific deployment scenario; rather than attempt to characterize the performance of the solution for all potential network configurations this thesis presents results from the best case scenario and provides a framework to determine the impact that varying the latency will have on the solution. The major factor that will impact this solution on the Internet is the latency separating the EN and the DN; the minimal amount of additional information transmitted during a failover prevents bandwidth from impacting the speed of a failover.
All of the ENs and DNs ran Ubuntu 10.04.1 with the 2.6.32-26 kernel. Each system was configured to have TCP metric-saving disabled, to ensure that TCP behaved in the same manner over multiple test runs. The ESR ran OpenBSD 4.7. The DNs used the bird OSPF routing daemon; the ESR used OpenOSPFd. The OSPF daemons were each configured to poll the system routing table once a second for updates. The virtual machines were all hosted on a VMware ESXi host consisting of an Intel Xeon E5420 processor with 12 GB of ECC RAM. All virtual machines were configured with the same scheduling priority and each VM was assigned a single virtual processor and 256 MB of RAM. The virtual machine host was not dedicated to the test; other machines were also running, simulating the typical environment in which a virtual cluster would be deployed. The virtual NICs used the E1000 driver. The commodity machines all had a 1.2 GHz VIA processor and 1 GB of RAM, and used the onboard VIA NIC.
In each failover case it is assumed that a failure had been detected and the DN-FD process forcibly terminated the DN. This is simulated by sending a SIGKILL to the DN process, ensuring any packets in transit were not processed and that the connections were not properly closed. The system has been configured to use a UDP data channel; that is, there is no assumption that an encapsulated packet will properly arrive at the DN. The test data is available online [12] .
A. Packet Loss During Failover
For the system to be considered reliable, not only must it prevent the client from losing connectivity, it should also minimize service interruption. To determine the interruption of service experienced during a failover in Accoriem, a constant stream of ICMP packets were sent from the client to a remote server, and the number of packets that were lost when the primary DN failed was measured. The rate at which the ICMP packets were sent depended on the test; the experiment was run with two rates, one of 10 packets per second (pps) and the other of 100 pps. In every case packets were lost consecutively -once the EN started receiving packets again, all subsequent packets were received.
The results for sending packets at a rate of 100 pps are shown in Figure 7 . Several key observations can be made about this graph: first, the behaviour of the system is quite similar regardless of the test environment; second, there exists a component in the system that causes a variable but bounded number of packets to be dropped; third, the majority of test runs on all platforms experienced approximately 1 second or less of loss.
The results show that the three environments behave similarly; the vast majority of measurements showing between 20 and 110 packets lost. This corresponds to a loss of packets lasting between 1 5 th of a second and 1 second. As previously mentioned there are three sources of potential delay in the failover process; as several experiments showed no packets lost it is possible to have all three of these sources of delay align to result in a seamless failover. This occurs when the round trip time between the EN and DN is quite small, and the time between the injection of the route in the DN software occurs immediately before the routing daemon polls the routing table for updates. One or more of these sources of delay are not always zero, as the majority of tests experienced some packet loss. This is partially the result of the time it takes the routing daemon to scan the table to detect the EN route; the number of packets lost is on the same order of magnitude as the scanning time. The impact of RTT on the results is evident in the differences between the Virtual/Virtual (V/V) environment and the Physical/Virtual (P/V) and Physical/Physical (P/P) environments -when using virtualization the cross-node latency is effectively 0 due to hypervisor optimizations. In both environments that had a physical link the packet loss times were slightly longer, shifting all the results up by a constant factor (the RTT).
Considering other sources of delay in the system also suggests that the routing daemon is not the only component contributing to the observed packet loss. It is unlikely that either the EN and DN themselves are contributing to this behaviour -neither component contains a non-uniform logic path. The DN codepath is the same regardless of a failure and the EN codepath simply detects a failure and starts writing to the same datapath in a different logical object. There is no reason that either of these elements would have a consistently non-uniform runtime. It is expected that both the operating system scheduler and virtual machine scheduler will schedule the DN process differently on each test run, however the similarity of the results across testbeds running on vastly different hardware suggests these scheduling differences do not have a significant impact on the system performance. While the OSPF daemon was configured to scan the routing table once every second, it is quite likely that this polling did not happen in an exactly uniform manner -network software often adds random delays in between periodic events like scanning to avoid potential conflicts with other nodes. One additional factor that introduced variability into the results is the amount of time it takes the OS to detect that the DN process had died and subsequently close the TCP connection. This impacts the time between T 1 and T 2 independent of the RTT, however it was difficult to precisely measure this.
The routing daemon is not the only cause of the different packet loss rates, however: Figure 7 show that each environment has results which cluster along two distinct values. For example, the V/V test environment has results which are clustered around 200 ms and 600 ms, while the P/V environment has results clustered near 250 ms and 1 s. This implies that a factor such as the speed of detecting DN termination and the OS closing all open connections could be responsible for the observed results. There are also several outliers, including several measurements showing more than 250 packets lost, that could have resulted from the DN OS occasionally taking a long time to close the open DN sockets.
There is really only one EN-side factor that is likely to differ in the various test environments: the speed at which the link is determined to have died. In the tested system, a link is marked as dead after the EN receives a TCP Close message, sent by the DN OS after detecting that the DN daemon has died. The OSPF polling time is DN-side, packet buffering is not performed, and there are no other major components involved in a fail event. The processing speed of the EN is relevant only with respect to how long it takes the client to detect link failure; it would not affect the number of packets processed because a failure does not introduce additional logic into the data path. Consequently, it appears that the more powerful client simply takes a shorter amount of time to detect that the link has died.
The experiment was also performed with a transmission rate of 10 pps; the results of these tests mirror the results of the 100 pps test. From a higher-level perspective, all of the environments experience a very small period during which packets are lost, and the number of packets lost in all cases is also quite low. The observability of this packet loss will depend upon the characteristics of the application running during a failure; web browsers will likely not experience a visible impact, while a voice call could have a noticeable but limited interruption of service (a sub-second hiccup) with the observed packet-loss behaviour.
B. Impact of Failure on Long-Lived TCP Flows
In order to measure the effect of a failure in the middle of a TCP session, a HTTP file download was initiated by the EN to an Apache web server one network hop past the ESR. Once the EN received approximately 40% of the file, the primary DN experienced a failure, causing the EN to switch to the secondary DN. The failure was triggered at the 40% mark to provide the application TCP flow sufficient time to fully maximize its congestion window, while still allowing time for the stream to ramp up again after the failure. The failure results are compared against an identical download that was conducted without the primary DN experiencing a failure. The test was repeated 30 times each for two different sizes of files, one that is 63 MB and one that is 625 MB. The 625 MB file size was chosen to represent a typical video file, while the 63 MB file size was chosen to represent a reasonably small file yet still take long enough to download that a failure could be introduced and measured. It is hypothesized that a DN failure will not cause a noticeable delay in the download of a file, based upon the packet loss numbers observed previously. In the following analysis, the null hypothesis is that a failure will not cause a noticeable increase in file download times; the alternative hypothesis is that a failure does cause a noticeable increase in file download times. The results of a difference-of-means tests for each test situation can be found in Table I .
Based upon these results, the null hypothesis has been dis-proven and a failure does cause a statistically significant increase in the download time of the file. Given a statistically significant increase, the question becomes whether this increase is significant to users of the system. Table I shows that at most 2.7 seconds were added to the download time; more than half of the experiments showed under 2 seconds being added to the download time. It is important to observe that the amount of the delay was independent of file size; the system introduces a reasonably fixed amount of time to each file download. This is expected -the system downloads part of the file normally, experiences a brief period where the download slows down as it recovers from the failure, and then resumes downloading the file normally. In the 63 MB file download on the V/V testbed the slowdown period constituted a significant portion of the total download time as both normal periods elapsed quickly, however in the 625 MB file download the P/P testbed the slowdown period was a minor component of the total download time as both normal periods lasted longer.
The size of the file being downloaded and the available bandwidth of the link then determines whether the slowdown caused by the failure is significant to the user. The testbeds used to perform these experiments are a somewhat unrealistic simulation of Internet behaviour as links rarely have an available rate of 1 Gbit/s. A smaller link rate will increase the amount of time it takes to download a file of equal size, and given that a failure has been shown to introduce a fixed amount of time to a download the relative impact of a failure will decrease as the link rate increases. Given that each application has different requirements it is not realistic to state that this solution is going to provide a suitable failover speed for all environments, but it is possible to say that a failure introduces a fixed, several second delay to an HTTP download.
VII. FUTURE WORK
The solution we have presented here has focused entirely on handling DN failures in a cluster that is co-located -the DNs and ESR are all located on the same subnet. This is required to ensure that the encapsulated IP address exposed by each client is routed properly, with all traffic going through the ESR and the proper DN. While adding a high level of reliability to a cluster located in a single data centre, it does nothing to allow the client to seamlessly fail over in the case of a data-centre failure. Fundamentally, dealing with data-centre failover is a much more complex problem, because it becomes necessary to redirect traffic destined to a specific IP prefix to a new data centre. There has been some work in this field, but there are a number of issues that need to be handled before any solution is ready for deployment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new architecture for developing failuretolerant encapsulation systems that support IP continuity without requiring complex server-side state synchronization. Not only does our solution provide transparent failover between DNs, it does so in a manner that is relatively straightforward to configure and expand as additional DNs are required. We have validated the approach via an implementation that is integrated into an existing encapsulation solution and demonstrated that the costs of adopting this approach are minimal. Experimentally, it was shown that our solution functions for both unreliable and reliable protocols (ICMP and HTTP, respectively), introducing only minor packet loss during a failure event while providing IP continuity across endpoints.
